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DAVIS v. UNITED STATES: GOOD FAITH,  
RETROACTIVITY, AND THE LOSS OF PRINCIPLE 
DAVID MCALOON∗
In Davis v. United States,
 
1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that evidence seized by the police in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment was admissible because the police performed their 
search in good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent.2  In so 
holding, the Court abandoned the principle of treating similarly si-
tuated defendants the same and drew into question the integrity of 
judicial review.3  This decision marks another step in the turn away 
from the principled justifications for the exclusionary rule toward a 
deterrence-only rationale that acknowledges a right with no remedy.4  
As a result, the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will 
cease as defendants have little to no incentive to challenge existing 
precedent, while law enforcement will be further emboldened to chal-
lenge the edges of what is constitutionally acceptable.5  Alternatively, 
the Court should have taken the unremarkable step of simply apply-
ing its own precedent appropriately, rather than crafting a new good-
faith exception at odds with the principles of our criminal justice sys-
tem.6
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 1.  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 4. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
On April 27, 2007, Willie Gene Davis was the passenger in a car 
that police pulled over for violation of a noise ordinance.7  Davis in-
itially told police that his name was Ernest Harris.8  When police dis-
covered that Davis was lying about his name, they arrested him for 
providing false information.9  Police had asked Davis to step out of 
the car and keep his jacket on, but instead Davis removed his jacket 
and left it on the front passenger seat of the car.10  Police then es-
corted him to their squad car.11 They returned to and searched the 
passenger compartment where Davis had been sitting and discovered 
a revolver in the pocket of Davis’s jacket.12
On October 27, 2007, Davis was indicted as a felon in possession 
of a revolver in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
  
13  Davis moved to 
suppress the gun, arguing that it was obtained by an illegal search of 
the automobile, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.14  The 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied 
Davis’s motion because the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
grants officers the ability to conduct a contemporaneous warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment and containers incident to an 
arrest.15  Davis preserved for appeal his objection to the decision, ar-
guing that the outcome of Arizona v. Gant,16 soon to be decided by the 
United States Supreme Court, could affect whether Davis’s gun could 
be admitted into evidence.17  A jury convicted Davis, and he was sen-
tenced to 220 months in prison.18
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the police search did vi-
 
 
 7. United States v. Davis, No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 
Apr. 28, 2008), aff’d, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).   
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  Davis argued that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment unless they fall within a set of well-defined exceptions, and that the 
facts of this case do not fall within any such exception.  Id. at *2–3.   
 15. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825 (11th Cir. 1996), abro-
gated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)). 
 16. 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
 17. Davis, 2008 WL 1927377, at *1–2. 
 18. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2419 
(2011).  
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olate Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, but further concluded that 
the evidence would not be suppressed because the search was done in 
good-faith reliance on appellate precedent.19  The court first rea-
soned that—under Gant’s new formulation—police could only con-
duct their search if Davis was “within reaching distance of the passen-
ger compartment at the time of the search.”20  Since Davis was sitting 
in the squad car at the time of the search, the court reasoned that, if 
Gant applied retroactively to Davis’s case, then police violated Davis’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.21  Because Supreme Court decisions are 
applied retroactively to all cases on appeal at the time of the decision, 
the court applied Gant to Davis’s case and held that the police vi-
olated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights.22
The Court of Appeals would not conclude, however, that exclu-
sion of evidence naturally follows from a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion.
  
23  Reasoning that exclusion of evidence is not an individual 
right, but exists only to deter police misconduct, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that exclusion should not apply to deter objectively rea-
sonable police activity.24  Given that police were acting in accordance 
with United States v. Gonzalez,25 the court applied a good-faith excep-
tion to their actions and refused to apply the exclusionary rule to Da-
vis’s case as doing so would serve no deterrent purpose.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the exclusionary rule should apply when police conduct a 
search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.
 
27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreason-
able searches and seizures.”28
 
 19. Id. at 1263, 1267–68. 
  The scope of that right and how best to 
 20. Id. at 1262 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. Id. at 1263.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1265–66. 
 25. 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
Gonzalez held that police officers could search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest regardless of the occupant’s actual control over the passenger compartment.  Id. at 
825.  
 26. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1268. 
 27. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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secure it has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court cases29 
and extensive literature.30
This Part will deal first with the change in law that prompted Da-
vis’s appeal: how the Fourth Amendment applies to the search of an 
automobile as an incident to arrest.
  
31  Second, this Part will outline 
the history of the exclusionary rule, from its principled origins to its 
recent shift to a deterrence-only rationale.32  Third, this Part will ad-
dress how the principled and deterrence-only rationales have affected 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the context of good-faith 
exceptions and the retroactive application of exclusion.33
A.  That Is Not What We Meant: The Supreme Court Limits Allowable 
Automobile Searches After a Straightforward Rule Proves to Be Not So 
Straightforward 
  
The Court has held that “searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment [but for] a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”34  One such exception is 
a search of the person performed incident to arrest.35
 
 29. A search of the Supreme Court database maintained by Washington University in 
St. Louis showed that the Court has heard 305 cases related to search and seizure/Fourth 
Amendment issues from 1946–2010.  Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions, THE SUPREME 
COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (follow “Criminal Procedure” 
hyperlink; then highlight “search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime 
Control Act)” and “search and seizure, vehicles”; then follow “Analyze” hyperlink).   
  The Court has 
 30. A Westlaw search of “Fourth Amendment” in law reviews and journals generated 
281 results for a one-year period, from April 12, 2011, to April 12, 2012.  
 31. See infra Part II.A. 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. See infra Part II.C. 
 34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).  
 35. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that, because a 
custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a 
search of the person incident to that arrest is also reasonable).  The search incident to ar-
rest has a back-and-forth history in the Supreme Court, with cases seemingly contradicting 
each other from one to the next.  The idea of a search incident to arrest made its first ap-
pearance in dictum in Weeks v. United States, when the Court stated that the right “to search 
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evi-
dences of crime” was “always recognized under English and American law.”  232 U.S. 383, 
392 (1914).  The Court expanded the right from persons to places, though again in dic-
tum, in Agnello v. United States. 269 U.S. 20, 30  (1925) (“The right without a search warrant 
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to 
search the place where the arrest is made . . . is not to be doubted.”).  This idea moved 
from dictum to holding in Marron v. United States. 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (holding that 
federal agents had a right to search an arrestee’s premises contemporaneously to the ar-
rest “in order to find and seize things used to carry on the criminal enterprise”).  
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also allowed a search incident to arrest to include the area within the 
arrestee’s immediate control.36  The Court included an arrestee’s 
immediate control (1) to protect officer safety, because the arrestee 
might have a weapon to resist arrest or escape, and (2) to prevent the 
destruction of evidence.37
In the context of automobile searches, the Court focused on of-
ficer safety, but also wanted to provide a straightforward rule for po-
lice to apply and grant an automatic right to search automobiles.  Re-
lying on the twin rationales of officer safety and protection of 
evidence, the Court held in New York v. Belton that the search incident 
to arrest exception included the interior of automobiles.
 
38  The Court 
reasoned that the relatively small size of the passenger compartment 
is invariably within the immediate control of an arrestee, and there-
fore an arrestee might easily reach for a weapon or destroy evidence.39
The Belton Court also focused on the need for a straightforward 
rule to apply to the search of an automobile incident to arrest.
 
40  In-
stead of trying to determine the area of immediate control for auto-
mobiles on a case-by-case basis, the Court reasoned that a bright-line 
rule would provide certainty to individuals as to the scope of their 
constitutional rights and to police officers as to the scope of their au-
thority to search.41  Therefore, the Court held that searches of an au-
tomobile incident to a lawful arrest were reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.42
Following Belton, the circuit courts remained divided over the 
scope of allowable searches of automobiles incident to arrest, particu-
larly when the arrestee was already out of the vehicle when the search 
was performed.  Some courts focused more on the concern for officer 
safety and preventing the destruction of evidence.
 
43
 
 36. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).  
  When courts ap-
plied this logic, they held that searches were unreasonable when the 
 37. Id. at 763–64 & n.9.  
 38. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).  This automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
for searches is distinct from the Carroll doctrine, which allows officers to search an auto-
mobile without a warrant whenever they have probable cause to believe evidence of a 
crime is inside the automobile.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). This 
includes any containers inside the car.  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991). 
 39. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.  
 40. Id. at 459–60.  
 41. Id.   
 42. Id. at 460.  
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The principle 
behind Belton and Chimel is to protect police officers and citizens . . . from the actions of an 
arrestee who might gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence.”).  
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arrestee was not in the vicinity of the automobile.44  Conversely, some 
federal circuit courts focused more on the Belton Court’s desire to 
create a straightforward rule.45  In these situations, courts upheld 
searches of automobiles as incident to arrest, even when the arrestee 
was not within reaching distance of the vehicle.46  As the law devel-
oped, some members of the Supreme Court noted the circuit split 
and expressed concern that police had assumed too much authority 
as a result of the Belton ruling.47
Given the circuit split over Belton’s scope and some concern that 
police were overreaching in their practice, the Court returned to the 
issue of automobile searches incident to arrest in Arizona v. Gant.
   
48  
There the Court said that treating Belton as presumptively allowing 
searches of cars incident to arrest created a “police entitlement rather 
than . . . an exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment.49  The Court reasoned that giving Belton such a broad reading 
“untether[ed] the rule from [its original] justifications” of officer 
safety and the need to prevent destruction of evidence.50
 
 44. E.g., id. at 379 (finding that the search of an arrestee’s vehicle was unjustified given 
that the arrestee was lying face down, handcuffed, surrounded by four police officers, six 
to ten feet away from the automobile);  United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 643–44 
(10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting “any justification” for police search of an automobile where the 
arrestee was in the squad car 100–150 feet away from his vehicle, as there was no danger 
the arrestee could reach a weapon or destroy evidence); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 
782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding a search of an arrestee’s vehicle unjustified when arrestee 
was handcuffed in the back of the police car).  
  The Court 
therefore held that the search of a vehicle incident to arrest is valid 
only when the occupant is unsecured and within reaching distance of 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (8th Cir. 2006) (uphold-
ing a search as valid under Belton, even though the arrestee had been arrested and sitting 
in a police car for sixty minutes because police need a clear, readily understandable rule). 
 46. See id. at 1103 (upholding a search where arrestee was secured in police car); see 
also United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that, under Belton, a 
search incident to arrest is valid whether or not the arrestee is within reach of the car and 
its contents at the time of the search), overrulled by United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264 
(6th Cir. 2011). 
 47. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628–29 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (questioning the reasoning of Belton that the passenger compartment is 
inevitably within the arrestee’s immediate control and recognizing that police have treated 
the right to search a car—regardless of the facts—as presumptively reasonable); see also id. 
at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (expressing concern that “lower court decisions 
seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant 
as a police entitlement rather than as an exception”). 
 48. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
 49. Id. at 342 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part)). 
 50. Id. at 343.  
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the passenger compartment at the time of the search.51  Writing in 
dissent, Justice Alito suggested that while the Court did not explicitly 
state as much, its decision overturned Belton, which in practice would 
cause the suppression of evidence gathered in searches carried out in 
good-faith reliance on settled case law.52
B.  From Principle to Empirical: The Court’s Remedy for Fourth 
Amendment Violations 
  
When police seize evidence illegally, the remedy for that Fourth 
Amendment violation is the exclusion of that evidence.53
The first time the Court excluded evidence solely because police 
violated the Fourth Amendment was in Weeks v. United States.
  This section 
explores the history of the exclusionary rule and its justification by the 
Court.  The Court first defended the exclusion of evidence as a neces-
sary component of the Fourth Amendment that was vital to maintain-
ing the rule of law.  More recently, the Court has said that exclusion is 
a judicially created remedy that can only be justified when it “pays its 
way” by objectively measuring its deterrent value against the cost of 
letting criminals go free.  
54  In 
Weeks, the Court refused to admit into evidence letters and papers 
seized from Weeks’s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment.55  
The Court rested its reasoning on the idea that the government 
should not benefit from acting illegally.56
 
 51. Id.  Additionally, the Court granted that searches would be valid if in pursuit of 
evidence related to the crime that caused the arrest.  Id.  It should be noted that the Court 
has also created exceptions to search automobiles where there is reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the suspect is dangerous, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983), and 
where police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).  
  Moreover, the Court was 
concerned that allowing illegally seized evidence might also taint the 
 52. Gant, 556 U.S. at 355–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 53. Congress has also made it possible for a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation to 
sue the individual officer or his or her department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  That 
remedy falls outside the scope of this Note.  
 54. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  Excluding evidence as a remedy was first used in Boyd v. Unit-
ed States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  There, however, exclusion was justified because police had 
violated the defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. at 633, 638 (finding that 
compelling a man to produce his personal papers so that they could be used against him 
at trial violated the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and con-
stituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 55. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
 56. See id. at 394 (suggesting that admitting tainted evidence into trial would “affirm by 
judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Con-
stitution”). 
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integrity of the court system.57  Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
without the exclusion of evidence, the Fourth Amendment would 
have no value and “might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”58  
This idea that the exclusion of evidence is a necessary component of 
Fourth Amendment protection continued throughout most of the 
first half of the twentieth century.59
The Court’s shift away from this original principle began when 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment should be incorpo-
rated onto the states was presented in Wolf v. Colorado.
  
60  In Wolf, the 
Court acknowledged that the right of privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment was necessary in a free society and therefore should ap-
ply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.61  But the 
Court refused to agree that exclusion of evidence was a necessary, 
constitutional requirement to guarantee Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.62  It instead suggested that exclusion was a judicially created re-
medy, and that crafting appropriate remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations would be better left to the states.63
When the Supreme Court ultimately found that the exclusionary 
rule applied to the states, it returned to the idea of judicial integrity, 
but also reasoned that exclusion would serve to deter police miscon-
duct.  In Mapp v. Ohio,
 
64 despite Mapp’s protests and without a search 
warrant, state officers forced entry into her house to look for a suspect 
they wanted to question in connection with a bombing.65  Once in-
side, officers discovered obscene materials and arrested Mapp for 
their possession.66
 
 57. See id. at 392 (stating that the government’s efforts to obtain a conviction through 
means that destroy constitutional rights “should find no sanction in the judgment of the 
courts”). 
  The Court found that the police violated Mapp’s 
 58. Id. at 393.  
 59. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (stating that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “the innocent and guilty alike,” and that the law provides ex-
clusion of evidence to secure constitutional protection); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (finding that “the [g]overnment’s own wrong cannot 
be used,” or else the Fourth Amendment would be reduced “to a form of words”).  
 60. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 61. Id. at 28.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 28, 32. 
 64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 65. Id. at 644.  The police came to Mapp’s house twice that day.  Id.  After Mapp first 
denied police entry, they returned a second time, handing her a piece of paper they 
claimed was a search warrant, which Mapp stuffed into her bosom.  Id.  Officers struggled 
with Mapp to get the paper back, ultimately “[r]unning roughshod over . . . [her].”  Id. at 
644–45. 
 66. Id. at 645.  
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Fourth Amendment rights, and held that the evidence obtained as a 
result of the unlawful search was “inadmissible in a state court.”67  In 
so holding, the Court stressed the importance of judicial integrity and 
the principle that the exclusionary rule has its origins in the Constitu-
tion.68  It also concluded that states had failed to provide appropriate 
remedies for Fourth Amendment violations without the exclusionary 
rule.69  The Court further reasoned that the government and its court 
system would lose legitimacy if they did not follow their own laws.70  
Finally, the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule is necessary as 
a deterrent to bad police action.71
After Mapp, the Court gradually abandoned judicial integrity as a 
justification for the exclusionary rule and instead focused on deter-
rence as the sole justification for the exclusion of evidence.
 
72  Indeed, 
in United States v. Calandra,73 the Court completely reframed the pur-
pose and meaning of the exclusionary rule.  In Calandra, the Court 
refused to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment from grand jury proceedings.74  The Court’s decision re-
lied entirely on the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule.75  
The Court reasoned that exclusion is not implicit in the Fourth 
Amendment but is instead a judicially created remedy.76  It stated fur-
ther that exclusion was not an individual right guaranteed by the 
Constitution,77
 
 67. Id. at 655.  
 and therefore concluded that the Constitution does 
 68. Id. at 659, 649.  
 69. Id. at 651–52.   
 70. Id. at 659.  
 71. See id. at 656 (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter [unlawful con-
duct] . . . by removing the incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment].”  (quoting El-
kins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the failure of other remedies at the 
state level to prevent law enforcement from engaging in the “‘shabby business’ of unlawful 
entry into a home”). 
 72. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusionary rule “rested 
on a theory that suppression of evidence in these circumstances was imperative to deter 
law enforcement authorities from using improper methods to obtain evidence”).  Chief 
Justice Burger reframed the discussion of the exclusionary rule by questioning its contin-
ued validity in the absence of evidence of deterrence.  See id. at 416.  
 73. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 74. Id. at 351–52. 
 75. See id. at 347 (“[T]he rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct . . . .”). 
 76. Id. at 348. 
 77. Id. at 347 (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to 
the . . . victim.”). 
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not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings.78  
Instead, as with any other judicially created remedy, exclusion would 
only be proper where its deterrent purpose is most effectively 
served.79  Reasoning that police are motivated by convictions in crim-
inal proceedings, the Court found that excluding evidence from 
grand jury proceedings would not deter police misconduct, and 
therefore the exclusionary rule should not apply.80
After Calandra, deterrence continued to be the touchstone for 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule,
 
81 subject to an objective 
study of the costs and benefits of exclusion.82  Furthermore, the Court 
shifted its analytical focus from the rights of the individual defendant 
to the social costs of excluding evidence.83
C.  Deterrence v. Principle: The Exclusionary Rule Applied (and Limited) 
  The Court’s cost-benefit 
measure of exclusion ultimately justified the creation of exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule and called into question the rule’s retroactive 
application.    
By turning away from the principled justification towards a deter-
rence-only rationale, the Court limited the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to scenarios where deterrence was thought to be most ef-
fectively served.  This shift led the Court to create many exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule where police officers conducted their search in 
objective good faith.84  Deterrence was also initially used as grounds to 
refuse to apply the exclusionary rule retroactively.  But the deterrence 
rationale would ultimately give way to principle in the context of re-
troactivity.85
 
 78. Id. at 348.  
   
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 351–52.  
 81. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (refusing to 
exclude evidence from parole hearings “because application of the rule in the criminal 
trial context already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches”); Illinois 
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987) (creating a good-faith exception for police reliance 
on “statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity” since those acting in good faith cannot 
be deterred).  
 82. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984) (using empirical data to 
note that the exclusionary rule, as any rule of evidence that might bar reliable, probative 
evidence from the jury, must “pay its way”).  
 83. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“First, the exclusionary rule 
is not an individual right and applies only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence. . . . 
In addition, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 84. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 85. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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1.  Deterrence Applied: The Court Refuses to Exclude Evidence When 
Law Enforcement Innocently Violate Fourth Amendment Rights 
The deterrence rationale narrowed the scope of the exclusionary 
rule with the introduction of the good-faith exception.  Reasoning 
that officers who act in good faith cannot be deterred, the Court has 
said that evidence will not be excluded where police rely in good faith 
on a warrant later found invalid; where police rely on a statute later 
overturned; where police rely on a judicial database informing them 
of an outstanding warrant later found to be false; and where police 
rely on their own database’s list of outstanding warrants that later 
turns out to be incorrect.  
The Court first created the good-faith exception in United States 
v. Leon.86  In Leon, police searched Leon’s home pursuant to a magi-
strate-issued warrant that a court later found invalid.87  The Court ac-
knowledged that many prior cases had implied that the exclusionary 
rule was “a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment,” but re-
jected this reasoning by suggesting that the Fourth Amendment con-
tains no express provision preventing the use of tainted evidence.88  
Instead, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule is “a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the party aggrieved.”89  The Court noted the huge so-
cial costs of letting the guilty go free and concluded that the exclusio-
nary rule should only apply where deterrence is best served.90  If the 
police believed they were acting legally, then excluding the evidence 
would not deter their actions in the future.91  The Court concluded 
that the exclusionary rule should not apply when police act in objec-
tively reasonable good faith on a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant.92
Following Leon, the Court created other exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule on the basis of police acting in good faith, each time rely-
ing on the deterrence rationale.  In Illinois v. Krull, the Court refused 
to exclude evidence where police performed a warrantless administra-
tive search in reliance on a statute that was later found invalid.
  
93
 
 86. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
  In 
 87. Id. at 903 & n.2.  
 88. Id. at 905–06.  
 89. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. at 907–08.  
 91. Id. at 918–19.  
 92. Id. at 926.  
 93. 480 U.S. 340, 342–43, 349–53 (1987). 
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Arizona v. Evans, officers acted in reliance on a court clerk’s record of 
an outstanding arrest warrant later found to be erroneous.94  The 
Court refused to suppress evidence found in a search incident to that 
false arrest, as police had acted in reasonable reliance on the court 
employees and were therefore undeterrable.95  Finally, in Herring v. 
United States, the facts were nearly identical to Evans with one distinc-
tion: the police department made the clerical errors rather than the 
court system.96  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that excluding the 
evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful arrest would not deter 
police misconduct since the failure to update the police database was 
negligent and not indicative of some systemic error or reckless disre-
gard for constitutional requirements.97
2.  Principle Applied: The Court Abandons the Deterrence Rationale 
in the Name of Even-Handed Justice and Applies the Exclusionary 
Rule Retroactively 
  The deterrence rationale, as 
expressed in these good-faith exceptions, has greatly limited the 
depth of the exclusionary rule and initially limited the breadth of the 
rule’s applicability in the context of retroactivity.    
Retroactivity deals with how broadly a new rule of criminal pro-
cedure will be applied.  When on June 19, 1961, the Court in Mapp v. 
Ohio declared that the exclusionary rule applied to the states, the 
question became whether the rule would apply only prospectively or 
retroactively as well.98  If the rule were to apply only prospectively, it 
would only apply to defendants whose trials were decided after June 
19, 1961.99
 
 94. 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).  
  If the rule were to apply retroactively, it would apply to de-
fendants whose trials had already concluded but whose convictions 
were still proceeding through the appellate process and were on di-
rect review or even to defendants who had already been through both 
trial and appeal, but were attempting to re-litigate their cases by way 
of collateral review.  Initially, the Court crafted a three-pronged test 
that focused on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and 
only applied the exclusionary rule prospectively.  The Court later 
found that this test treated similarly situated defendants differently 
 95. Id. at 15–16. 
 96. 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009). 
 97. Id. at 144–46.  
 98. Following Mapp v. Ohio, there was a split of authority among several courts of ap-
peals concerning its retroactivity. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 n.2 (1965), over-
ruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).     
 99. See, e.g., id. (holding that Mapp was to apply only prospectively).  
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and forced courts to ignore existing law.  Ultimately, the Court re-
jected the deterrence rationale and embraced principled justifications 
of retroactivity for those still on direct review.  
In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court relied on the deterrence ratio-
nale and held that the exclusionary rule would not be available for 
defendants whose convictions were final at the time Mapp v. Ohio was 
announced.100  The Court listed three elements to examine in deter-
mining whether a new rule of criminal procedure should be given re-
troactive effect: the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed upon 
the old rule, and the effect of a retroactive application of the new rule 
on the administration of justice.101  First, emphasizing that the prima-
ry purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter lawless police con-
duct,102 the Linkletter Court reasoned that the police misconduct had 
already occurred and would not be deterred by releasing prisoners.103  
As to the second prong, the Court found that states had relied on and 
obtained convictions in the absence of an exclusionary rule in state 
proceedings prior to Mapp.104  Under the third prong of the analysis, 
the Court found that relitigating cases “would tax the administration 
of justice to the utmost.”105  Therefore, under Linkletter, the exclusio-
nary rule would not be applied retroactively to cases already final.106
The Court reevaluated its retroactivity doctrine, returned to 
principle, and ultimately overturned Linkletter and its progeny in Grif-
fith v. Kentucky.
   
107  In Griffith, the Court held that a “failure to apply a 
newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct 
review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”108  The 
Court first reasoned that, under Article III, its job was to adjudicate 
cases and controversies, not to promulgate new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure.109
 
 100. Id. at 622, 636–37.  In a footnote, the Court described convictions that were final as 
ones “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, 
and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.”  
Id. at 622 n.5.  
  Accordingly, “the integrity of judicial review 
requires that [the Court] apply [the new] rule to all similar cases 
 101. Id. at 636.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 637. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. The Court used similar reasoning in the context of Miranda warnings to hold that 
even defendants still on direct review would not “benefit fully from . . . new standards go-
verning in-custody interrogation.”  Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729–32 (1966).   
 107. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 108. Id. at 322. 
 109. Id.  
 2012] DAVIS v. UNITED STATES 1271 
pending on direct review.”110  Failure to apply the law as it is unders-
tood would call into question the entire purpose of the court sys-
tem.111
Second, the Court reasoned that “selective application of new 
rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants 
the same.”
  
112  Stressing principles of fairness and equality under the 
law, the Court stated that it does not resolve only one case based on 
its best understanding of the law and then neglect to apply that un-
derstanding to all other cases.113  Otherwise, courts would essentially 
be disregarding current law.114  Therefore, the Court held “that a new 
rule [of criminal procedure] is to be applied retroactively to all cases, 
state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.”115
The good-faith exceptions and the retroactivity doctrine affect 
the application of the exclusionary rule.  In the good-faith exceptions 
and the retroactivity doctrine, deterrence plays a role.  But where the 
retroactivity jurisprudence first focused on the deterrent purpose of 
exclusion in deciding whether the rule would apply, the principle 
eventually triumphed over deterrence.  Conversely, the good-faith ex-
ceptions are rooted in the Court’s shift in focus from principle to a 
deterrence-only rationale.  
  
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that 
a gun found in Davis’s jacket was properly admitted into evidence 
against him.116  The Court reasoned that, because the purpose of ex-
cluding evidence is to deter police conduct, when police act in good-
faith reliance on binding appellate precedent, excluding the fruits of 
that search serves no deterrent purpose, and therefore exclusion 
would not apply.117
 
 110. Id. at 323.  
 
 111. See id. (“If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best 
understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so 
adjudicate any case at all.” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted))). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 326.  
 115. Id. at 328.    
 116. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2425–26, 2429 (2011). 
 117. Id. at 2423–24, 2426.  
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion stated that the “sole purpose [be-
hind suppressing evidence] is to deter future Fourth Amendment vi-
olations.”118  The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule “is a pru-
dential doctrine, . . . created by [the] Court to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty” of the Fourth Amendment against unreason-
able searches and seizures.119  “Exclusion is not,” the Court reasoned, 
“a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury 
occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”120  Exclusion is only appli-
cable where it would lead to “appreciable deterrence” of future police 
violations.121  The Court does not reflexively apply exclusion to every 
Fourth Amendment violation, but instead weighs the costs and deter-
rence benefits of exclusion.122  As such, the Court continued, a main 
component of the cost-benefit analysis in determining the efficacy of 
exclusion is the culpability of the offending officer.123
Applying this rationale to Davis’s situation, the Court concluded 
that, although police violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, they 
had acted in reliance on binding precedent, and their actions were 
therefore not culpable.
   
124  The Court reasoned that at the time police 
searched Davis’s jacket, their actions were constitutional under New 
York v. Belton.125  It was not until two years after Davis’s search that the 
Court crafted a new rule in Arizona v. Gant, under which the police 
would have violated Davis’s rights.126  The Court concluded that—as 
Davis’s case was still on direct review—he would receive the retroac-
tive application of the Gant rule, and therefore that police did violate 
his Fourth Amendment rights.127
 
 118. Id. at 2426.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Kagan 
joined in the majority opinion.  
  But the Court returned to its rea-
soning that a Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically 
trigger exclusion; rather, exclusion will only follow if it deters future 
 119. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 120. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 121. Id. at 2426–27 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 122. Id. at 2427. 
 123. Id. (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)).  
 124. Id. at 2428. 
 125. Id.  The Belton rule stated that officers could search the passenger compartment of 
an automobile incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle.  Id. at 2424 (citing 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).  
 126. Under Gant, an automobile search incident to an occupant’s arrest is constitution-
al (1) if the arrestee if within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if 
the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime 
of arrest.  Id. at 351.  
 127. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431. 
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police misconduct.128  Since the police acted in reliance on binding 
precedent, the Court concluded that the “absence of police culpabili-
ty dooms Davis’s claim,”129 and therefore the exclusionary rule would 
not apply.130
Speaking to the dissent, the Court argued that this reasoning was 
not incompatible with the Court’s “retroactivity precedent under Grif-
fith.”
  
131  The Court reasoned that the retroactivity jurisprudence is on-
ly “concerned with whether . . . a new rule is available on direct review 
as a potential ground for relief.”132  Retroactivity merely “lifts what 
would otherwise be a categorical bar” to Davis’s opportunity for ob-
taining redress, but retroactivity “does not . . . determine what the 
‘appropriate remedy’ (if any) the defendant should obtain.”133  The 
Court concluded that “retroactive application of a new rule of subs-
tantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question whether [evidence 
will be excluded but] it does not answer that question.”134
The Court further rejected Davis’s argument that its decision 
would “stunt the development of Fourth Amendment law.”
   
135  The 
Court suggested that this line of thinking misconstrues the role of the 
exclusionary rule, which exists solely to deter future police miscon-
duct: The rule was not designed to facilitate a defendant’s ability to 
challenge existing precedent.136
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the Court’s application 
of the good-faith exception to an officer’s reliance on binding appel-
late precedent.
   
137  He argued that the Court had previously rejected 
as unworkable the idea of considering an officer’s reliance on 
precedent in favor of a clear approach, under which any new rule for 
the conduct of criminal prosecutions would apply retroactively to all 
cases pending on direct review.138
 
 128. Id.  
  Justice Breyer suggested that a re-
turn to an inquiry of whether an officer was acting in “objectively rea-
sonable . . . reliance on binding appellate precedent” would require a 
case-by-case analysis that was highly fact-dependent and result in 
 129. Id. at 2428. 
 130. Id. at 2434.  
 131. Id. at 2430. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2430–31. 
 134. Id. at 2431 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)). 
 135. Id. at 2432. 
 136. Id.  The Court stressed that it had “repeatedly rejected efforts to expand the focus 
of the exclusionary rule beyond deterrence of culpable police conduct.”  Id. 
 137. Id. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 2436.  
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“complex legal argument and police force confusion.”139  He further 
argued that “the Court’s distinction between (1) retroactive applica-
tion of a new rule and (2) availability of a remedy is highly artificial 
and runs counter to precedent.”140  He suggested that “the source of a 
new rule is the Constitution itself,” and when the Court applies a new 
rule retroactively, it is not determining “the temporal scope of a newly 
announced right, but whether a violation of [that] right . . . prior to 
the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to 
the relief sought.”141  Here, the Court conceded that the police 
search, like the search in Gant, violated Davis’s rights, but unlike 
Gant, Davis was not entitled to the same remedy of suppression of 
evidence.142  This, Justice Breyer concluded, left Davis with a right 
without a remedy.143
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Breyer suggested, the Court’s 
decision threatened to undermine well-settled Fourth Amendment 
law.
 
144  He remarked that the Court had created very few exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule on the basis of police good faith.145  Justice 
Breyer reasoned that this is because in many of the cases where de-
fendants sought suppression, police had acted in good faith but still 
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual.146  For the 
Court now to apply the exclusionary rule only when police have acted 
either recklessly, grossly negligently, or in bad faith would affect so 
many cases that “the ‘good faith’ exception will swallow the exclusio-
nary rule.”147  Justice Breyer concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
would no longer protect citizens from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.148
 
 139. Id. at 2437 (quoting the majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. (quoting Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 142. Id. at 2436. 
 143. Id. at 2437.  
 144. Id. at 2438–39. 
 145. Id. at 2439.  Justice Breyer listed the various good faith exceptions where the police 
acted on: a defective warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); a mistake in a 
court database, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); a mistake in a police database, Her-
ring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); and an unconstitutional statute authorizing the 
search, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 146. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 2440. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS  
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court held that where po-
lice violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in conducting a 
search, but do so in good-faith reliance on binding appellate 
precedent, the evidence found in that illegal search is admissible at 
trial.149  This decision incorrectly expands the deterrence rationale of 
the exclusionary rule onto the retroactivity doctrine, sweeping prin-
ciple away and leaving a right with no remedy.150  It represents anoth-
er step away from principle to a flawed, deterrence-only rationale in 
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence.151  As a result, the Court 
has created a system that dramatically reduces the adversarial process 
and threatens to stultify Fourth Amendment litigation as a whole.152  
It encourages an unhealthy gaming of the system for defense attor-
neys while simultaneously encouraging constitutional violations on 
the part of law enforcement.153  As an alternative, the Court should 
have refused to create a new good-faith exception based on over-
turned law, and instead applied the retroactivity doctrine as it has 
been well understood.154
A.  A Right With No Remedy: Adherence to Deterrence Sweeps Away All 
Principle 
  
The Davis decision marked another step on the steady march 
away from principle.  In refusing to properly apply the Gant rule re-
troactively, the Court ignored its own precedent regarding retroactivi-
ty while also refusing to apply the most basic principles of justice.  
Sadly, this decision was simply the next logical step in an irrational ju-
risprudence regarding the role of the exclusionary rule.   
1.  What’s in a Name?  The Davis Good-Faith Exception Tramples 
the Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine and Acknowledges a Right with 
No Remedy 
The Davis decision, which in name created a good-faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule, in practice overturned the Court’s juri-
sprudence on the retroactive application of decisions regarding con-
stitutional rights.  The Court attempted to sidestep this criticism by 
 
 149. Id. at 2423–24 (majority opinion).  
 150. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 151. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 152. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 153. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 154. See infra Part IV.C. 
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suggesting that retroactive application of a rule does not imply re-
troactive application of a remedy.  This logic ignores the Court’s own 
statements regarding retroactivity and the underlying reasoning of 
the retroactivity doctrine.  The result is a decision that ignores fun-
damental principles of justice and leaves a right with no remedy.  
When the Court created a good-faith exception for reliance on 
subsequently overturned precedent, it overturned the current stan-
dard for retroactivity and returned to a previously rejected standard.  
Prior to Davis, cases involving good-faith exceptions focused on 
whether the violation that occurred warranted evidence suppression, 
while retroactivity focused on whether a particular defendant was en-
titled to relief.155  But Davis’s new good-faith exception for overturned 
precedent conflated those two issues and now asks the same question 
for suppression as it does for retroactivity: whether a defendant will 
benefit from a new decision holding that conduct once thought to be 
constitutional is now regarded as unconstitutional.156  This is why, in 
reading Davis, it is hard to distinguish its reasoning from the previous-
ly rejected retroactivity doctrine under Linkletter and its progeny.157  
The Court responded to this criticism by suggesting that it was in fact 
applying the Gant rule retroactively, but that retroactive application of 
a rule does not guarantee application of a remedy.158
The problem with this defense is that it ignores the Court’s own 
language to the contrary.  In Davis, the Court reasoned that “retroac-
tivity . . . is concerned with whether . . . a new rule is available . . . as a 
potential ground for relief,” not whether relief would be granted.
 
159
 
 155. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 
1077, 1103 (2011).  
  
Prior to Davis, however, the Court had stated the exact opposite: the 
question of retroactivity is not whether a new rule would apply, but 
 156. Id. at 1103–04.   
 157. Compare Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426, 2428 (2011) (resting the 
Court’s holding on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the police reliance 
on precedent), with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 635–36 (1965) (refusing to apply 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), retroactively onto state decisions because it would not 
serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and because state courts had relied 
on a pre-Mapp lack of exclusion), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).  See 
also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537 (1975) (noting that retroactivity turned on 
whether “law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they 
had seized was admissible at trial . . . even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure 
have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner”).  
 158. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2430.  
 159. Id.  
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rather whether the remedy for a violation of that rule was available.160  
Because the Court has not technically announced a new rule at all, 
the question was not whether a new rule would apply.161  Rather, what 
the Court has done is correct what was an earlier, erroneous interpre-
tation of the law.162  The Gant Court did not create a new rule for au-
tomobile searches; it corrected an earlier, incorrect understanding of 
the Constitution in relation to automobile searches.163
This understanding is consistent with the Court’s understanding 
of its own role. Dating back to its common-law origins, the role of the 
court has always been to declare what the law is and not to create new 
laws that require retroactive application.
  Therefore, 
Davis’s right already existed, and required no retroactive application.  
164  Under this logic, a “newly 
announced” constitutional rule requires no retroactive application 
because the rule pre-existed the Court’s announcement of that 
rule.165  Retroactivity is only concerned with whether a remedy should 
apply.  Therefore, the Court should have excluded the evidence re-
covered from the unlawful search of Davis’s jacket, rather than simply 
acknowledging that his rights were violated without granting him a 
remedy.166
 
 160. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008) (“What we are actually deter-
mining when we assess the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is . . . whether a violation of the 
right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal de-
fendant to the relief sought.”) (cited in Davis 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J. dissenting)).  
The Court cites Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84 (1994), to defend its position that retroac-
tive application does not require relief.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431 (majority opinion). But 
the Powell decision, while concerned with retroactive application of a remedy, is distin-
guishable.  In Powell, the Court remanded the case to the Nevada Supreme Court without 
instructions for a remedy because, among other things, there was no remedy yet estab-
lished for the violation in question—an excessive delay before a probable cause determi-
nation hearing. Powell, 511 U.S. at 84.  Although subject to numerous exceptions, suppres-
sion of evidence is still the recognized remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.  See 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule serves to “compel re-
spect for the constitutional guaranty” of the Fourth Amendment).     
  By refusing to grant Davis a new trial where the illegally 
obtained evidence would be excluded, the Court effectively over-
 161. Danforth, 554 U.S. at 271.  
 162. Id.  
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 48–52. 
 164. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (stating that Court decisions “declar[e] what the law already is,” rather than 
“creat[e] the law”) (emphasis removed); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*69–71 (explaining that judges do not “make a new law, but [rather] vindicate the old one 
from misrepresenatation”). 
 165. Danforth, 554 U.S. at 271; cf. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, 
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 59–60 (1966) (discussing the 
Blackstonian interpretation of discovering the law and how courts, in deciding cases, nec-
essarily apply rules retroactively).  
 166. United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011).  
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turned Griffith v. Kentucky, in which it had held that new decisions re-
garding criminal procedure would apply retroactively to cases on di-
rect review.167  In doing so, the Court violated the principled justifica-
tions for retroactivity: the requirement that courts apply the law as 
they understand it and treat similarly situated defendants the same.168
The deterrence rationale applied in Davis sweeps away the prin-
cipled justification of judicial integrity underlying the current retroac-
tivity doctrine.  The Court has its power of judicial review because the 
people trust that it will resolve all cases on direct review in accordance 
with its understanding of constitutional principles.
 
169  With the Davis 
decision, the Court created an exception that allows appellate courts 
to ignore the current understanding of the law.  In this case, the Ele-
venth Circuit and the Supreme Court refused to properly apply the 
Gant rule to Davis’s case, even though the Gant rule represented the 
Court’s current understanding of the constitutionality of automobile 
searches incident to arrest.170  When the Court reaches a conclusion 
about a rule of law, but then refuses to apply that rule of law to cases 
properly before it, the Court’s own validity and integrity comes into 
question.171
Even worse, the Davis decision explicitly states that similarly si-
tuated defendants will be treated differently.  Rodney Gant received 
the benefit of exclusion of evidence,
  
172 while Willie Davis did not 
simply because his case reached appellate courts second.173
 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 
  Treating 
107–115. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 112–115. 
 169. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgments of two of the three consolidated cases and dissenting in one) (“If we do not re-
solve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing 
constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at 
all. . . . [T]he Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases be-
fore us that have not already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply an as-
sertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legisla-
tion.”).  
 170. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24 (refusing to suppress the gun found in Davis’s jack-
et even though the search was unconstitutional under Gant); United States v. Davis, 598 
F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (same).  
 171. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (stating that courts of law must resolve cases on direct 
review under the best understanding of the law at the time); see also JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971) (noting that the rule of law is compromised when judges 
fail to apply the appropriate rule as a part of regular and impartial administration of jus-
tice). 
 172. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
 173. Although, in this instance, it makes sense that Davis reached appeal second.  Rod-
ney Gant was originally arrested on August 25, 1999, id. at 335, and his first motion to sup-
press was denied on June 5, 2000,  State v. Gant, No. CR-20000042, 2000 WL 35630010 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. June 5, 2000). This was the beginning of eight years of litigation for Gant, 
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similarly situated defendants differently violates not only the retroac-
tivity doctrine, but also our most basic principles of justice.174  Even a 
child can accept an arbitrary parental decision—such as no television 
after school—provided that decision is applied equally to brother and 
sister alike.175  That is why equal treatment under the law is applied 
outside the context of retroactivity176 and has been affirmed time and 
again by the Supreme Court.177
The end result in Davis is a decision that violates the basic prin-
ciple that every right must have a remedy.
  Equal treatment under the law is ne-
cessary to our sense of justice, and requires that like defendants be 
treated alike.  
178  Remarkably, the Court 
freely admits this point.179  But remedies define rights.180  And the Su-
preme Court has recognized the exclusion of evidence as the appro-
priate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, without which the 
right is reduced to a mere “form of words.”181
 
including two separate grants of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 
Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008); Arizona v. Gant, 538 U.S. 976 (2003). Davis was 
originally arrested in April of 2007. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425. The point remains true, how-
ever, that Gant had his final appeal on direct review decided on April 21, 2009, before the 
Supreme Court, while Davis did not finish his direct review until June 16, 2011. See Gant, 
556 U.S. at 332; Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2421.    
  It seems that some Jus-
tices on the Court would be more content with using other remedies 
 174. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 226–27 (1977) (discussing the 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause to equal treatment and to treatment as an equal, 
whereby every person has the right “to be treated with the same respect and concern as 
anyone else”); see also Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History 
in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 588 (2000) (offering the notion 
“that justice demands that like cases be treated alike” as a reason for applying precedent to 
like-situated defendants).  
 175. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989) (illustrating the importance of “appearance of equal treatment”).  
 176. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 177. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that prosecutions 
of defendants are subject to constitutional restraints under the equal protection compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause and cannot be arbitrarily ignored). 
 178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).  
 179. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430–31 (2011) (acknowledging the ap-
plication of the Gant rule, but only as a potential ground for relief).  
 180. See PAUL SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 
26–27 (1983) (rejecting utilitarian arguments regarding the efficiency of rights and ar-
guing that the remedy of rights is essential to the court’s legitimacy).  
 181. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920); see also Yale 
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an 
“Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983) (arguing that, because 
courts must “give meaning to constitutional values,” exclusion is a necessary remedy of the 
Fourth Amendment); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1365, 1389 (1983) (rejecting other possible remedies for Fourth Amendment violations). 
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for Fourth Amendment violations.182  But this suggestion ignores the 
decision to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the states in part 
because the states failed to come up with valid, alternative remedies 
for Fourth Amendment violations.183
2.  Principle Denied: The Court’s Turn Away from the Principled 
Justification of the Retroactivity Doctrine Is the Next Step in a 
Turn Away from Principle in the Exclusionary Rule 
  The Davis decision has shone a 
spotlight on what has been an inherently flawed rationale underlying 
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence.  
The Davis decision, in acknowledging a right with no remedy, 
was the next logical step in the Court’s irrational exclusionary rule ju-
risprudence.  Over the last forty years, the Court has shifted its focus 
from the rights of the defendant to the culpability of the police.  Each 
time the Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, it relied on a faulty premise: Deterrence of police conduct is the 
sole justification for the exclusion of evidence.184  The Court has used 
this logic to say that when police act in good faith, they cannot be de-
terred and exclusion should not apply.185  The logic seems sound, ex-
cept that the premise ignores the Court’s original, principled justifica-
tions of the exclusionary rule.186  Additionally, the deterrence-only 
justification is internally flawed and not based on the empirical study 
that the Court’s cost-benefit analysis demands.187
 
 182. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Scalia suggested that a civil remedy, a Section 1983 lawsuit, was not available at the 
time of Mapp, but may serve as an effective alternative to exclusion).  There is constant dis-
cussion of alternative remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.  See, e.g., Guido Calabre-
si, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (2003) (suggesting sentencing re-
ductions as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the 
Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49 (proposing tort sanctions against officers and de-
partments).  But no proposed alternatives are as effective as the exclusionary rule. Sam J. 
Ervin, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 283, 296–97.  
  Ultimately, this log-
 183. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–53 (1961); see also Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio 
at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321–22 (detailing the former California Su-
preme Court justice’s conversion to the exclusionary rule as a necessary corollary to the 
Fourth Amendment); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974) (suggesting that other remedies for Fourth Amendment vi-
olations are not “as a practical matter, maintainable,” and that the exclusionary rule is the 
“primary instrument for enforcing the fourth amendment”). 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 86–97. 
 185. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 141–44 (2009) (explaining the ra-
tionale of the good-faith exception and enumerating the times where the Court has ap-
plied it).  
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 55–59, 64–71.  
 187. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
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ic sets the exclusionary rule on an unstable foundation that has top-
pled over and destroyed the principled justifications underlying the 
retroactivity doctrine.  
At its inception, the exclusionary rule rested on a principled idea 
that the government should not benefit from its own law breaking.188  
In particular, the Court was concerned with the idea of judicial integr-
ity and the notion that courts should not approve prior constitutional 
violations by allowing the fruits of those violations to be used at tri-
al.189  This theme resonated through decades of Supreme Court juri-
sprudence,190 culminating in the incorporation of the exclusionary 
rule against the states.191  The Court noted that exclusion was implicit 
in the Constitution,192 and necessary to ensure the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment.193
When deterrence first emerged as a rationale for exclusion, it was 
as an additional sword to justify the exclusionary rule as a means of 
guaranteeing that officers and agencies comply with the Fourth 
Amendment.
  
194  But the Court turned the deterrence justification on 
its head: rather than being used to further justify exclusion, the Court 
began to question the continued validity of the exclusionary rule in 
the absence of definitive proof of its deterrent value.195
 
 188. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (emphasizing that unlawful 
conduct of the government violating constitutional rights “should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution 
and to which people . . . have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental 
rights”).  
  Ultimately, 
 189. Id. at 392, 398.  
 190. See supra note 59.  
 191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The Court continued its principled justifica-
tion in Mapp, stating that “no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.”  Id. at 
657. 
 192. Id. at 649; see also Ervin, supra note 182, at 287  (calling the exclusionary rule a ne-
cessary “guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures”).  But see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785–86 (1994) (arguing that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion of evidence, that exclusion was never con-
ceived by the Framers, and that a tort action against law enforcement is the clear and ap-
propriate remedy).    
 193. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.  
 194. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (noting that “[t]he rule is calcu-
lated to prevent, not to repair,” and concluding that the way to compel respect for the 
Fourth Amendment is to remove the incentive to disregard it); see also David C. Gray, A 
Spectacular Non Sequitur, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43 n.305) 
(noting that deterrence served to justify exclusion, but did not replace principle as the sole 
justification).  
 195. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 416–17 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (questioning the effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule without clear proof that it serves to actually deter police from violating 
the Fourth Amendment); cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (reason-
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the Court turned away from the original, principled justifications and 
classified them as mere dicta.196  This has relegated the principled jus-
tifications of the exclusionary rule to the dissenting dustbins.197  Ra-
ther than using deterrence to further justify exclusion, the lack of de-
terrence became a shield to defend the creation of exceptions that 
would dramatically limit the scope of the exclusionary rule.198
Besides ignoring prior precedent, a deterrent-only rationale is in-
ternally flawed.  Under its current rationale, the Court has treated the 
exclusion of evidence as a punishment for police misconduct rather 
than a guarantee of constitutional rights.
 
199  This punishment ap-
proach is built on a fallacy.  Simply because exclusion would not deter 
officers who acted in good faith does not mean that exclusion would 
not deter future officers from engaging in unlawful behavior.200
 
ing that the exclusionary rule does not automatically bar the use of illegally seized evi-
dence in all proceedings, but only when the purpose of deterrence is “most efficaciously 
served”).  
  The 
Court has crafted good-faith exceptions by focusing solely on specific 
deterrence—deterrence of those officers who acted in good faith—
rather than on the general deterrence to be gained by excluding all 
 196. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Expansive dicta in 
Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule not only deters police misconduct but also al-
lows “the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness” (quoting Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 198. See id. at 147–48 (majority opinion) (refusing to exclude evidence where police 
conduct was negligent at best and was therefore not deterrable); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 
1, 14–15 (1995) (reasoning that police could not be deterred when they relied on a court 
database informing them of an outstanding warrant and therefore evidence obtained 
should not be excluded); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353 (1987) (holding that evidence 
should not be excluded where police rely on a statute authorizing warrantless searches and 
would therefore not be deterred); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (con-
cluding that, because police will not be deterred where they rely on a magistrate’s warrant, 
evidence should not be excluded); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52  (concluding that, because 
police are only concerned with criminal trials, evidence should be admitted at a grand jury 
proceeding as it would not deter police misconduct); see also Gray, supra note 194, at 10 
(arguing that deterrence has been used as a shield for exceptions to the exclusionary rule, 
though it is ill-equipped to do so).  
 199. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423, 2428 (2011) (referring to the 
“sanction” of exclusion for police misconduct and concluding that the absence of police 
culpability “dooms Davis’s claim”).  On top of continually referring to exclusion as a sanc-
tion, the Court’s focus on the police’s level of culpability in determining whether or not to 
apply the exclusionary rule suggests that exclusion is a punishment.  See Herring, 555 U.S. 
at 137 (stating that the exclusion of evidence turns on the culpability of the police and 
therefore the potential to deter wrongful conduct); see also Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of 
Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1311 (2000) (suggesting that exclu-
sion acts as a sanction to penalize police for their misconduct).  
 200. Gray, supra note 194, at 9–10.  
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evidence obtained because of constitutional violations.201  It is true 
that the individual officers who searched Davis’s car acted in accor-
dance with what they reasonably believed was the law and so therefore 
cannot be deterred.202  But that does not mean that imposing exclu-
sion could not function as an institutional deterrence, cautioning law 
enforcement from taking unnecessary risks.203
Moreover, the Court’s rationale claims to be based on empirical 
research regarding the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule,
  
204 
but in fact has little evidence to support any of its claims.205  Studies 
comparing the effectiveness of police deterrence against the number 
of lost convictions are largely inconclusive.206  But the Court continues 
to make claims about the huge social costs of the exclusionary rule.207
 
 201. See William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 369 (1981) 
(referring to the rationale underlying the good-faith exceptions as “premised on a naive 
and simplistic understanding of deterrence”).   
  
These are largely anecdotal and are best summed up by Judge Cardo-
zo’s refrain that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
 202. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2438 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Randy E. Barnett, Resolving 
the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY 
L.J. 937, 951–52 (1983) (arguing that one of the factors one must take into account to de-
termine the feasibility of deterring police is whether or not police know their action is il-
legal).  
 203. Posner, supra note 182, at 66.  Judge Posner rejected the idea that exclusion could 
not deter even in the face of those acting in good faith since the exclusion remedy could 
compel officers to take steps to reduce the probability of committing even innocent viola-
tions.  Id.; see also Gray, supra note 194, at 37 (reasoning that exclusion of evidence can act 
as a general deterrent even where the individual police conduct was non-culpable); Mer-
tens & Wasserstrom, supra note 201, at 394–95 (arguing that the exclusionary rule acts as a 
systemic deterrence because police departments institutionalize judicially articulated stan-
dards for the Fourth Amendment).  
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (reasoning that the 
decision whether to exclude evidence should be based on weighing the costs and benefits 
of exclusion).  
 205. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the deterrence rationale for purporting to be rooted in empiricism but offering “on-
ly limited empirical support”).  
 206. See Bradley C. Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A 
Conservative Argument for Its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 558, 572 (1982) (“There is no way to 
demonstrate that the rule works or that it does not work . . . .”).  For an earlier study of the 
exclusionary rule’s effectiveness, with equally mixed results, see generally Dallin H. Oaks, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).  
 207. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (“The analysis must also account for the ‘substantial 
social costs’ generated by the rule.” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907)); see also Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (referring to the “substantial social costs” of ex-
cluding evidence) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
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blundered.”208  While a clever turn of phrase,209 the statement does 
little to provide actual evidence of how often criminals actually “go 
free” because evidence is suppressed.  The argument remains compel-
ling, however, since the exclusionary rule flies in the face of general 
rules of evidence that would admit otherwise probative and reliable 
evidence.210
Now the deterrence-only rationale has gone from a sword justify-
ing the exclusionary rule, to a shield defending its exceptions, and fi-
nally a large club to smash away any other doctrines in its path.  It was 
the next logical step in what has been an irrational jurisprudence that 
acknowledges a right with no remedy.  The Court had previously re-
jected the Davis logic twenty-five years ago in the name of principle.
  
211
B.  Right With No Remedy Applied: The Government Always Wins 
  
Now the Court returns to its previously rejected rationale, and Willie 
Davis does not get the same relief that Rodney Gant did.  The Court 
recognizes that Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, but 
he gets no remedy.  Going forward, the Davis decision will create 
many problems not only in principle, but in practice as well.  
The Davis decision creates a number of problems going forward.  
Given that defendants have little hope for a remedy, the new good-
faith exception stultifies Fourth Amendment law. As defendants have 
little incentive to challenge existing law, the adversarial process is re-
duced to an exercise in futility.  Furthermore, given that evidence 
would be admitted under the new exception even if the defendant 
 
 208. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  Put another way, a large part of 
the problem people have with the exclusionary rule is that—because it is only invoked by 
alleged criminals seeking to suppress incriminating evidence—it “rubs our noses in it.”  
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974).   
 209. It is nearly impossible to read an exclusionary rule decision or scholarly work that 
does not use this quote. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 148; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 614 (2006); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 970 (2010). 
 210. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. 
REV. 929, 951 (1965) (noting that the exclusionary rule does not exist to protect against 
unreliable evidence being admitted); Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American 
Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 246, 251 (1961) 
(noting the Anglo-American principle that illegal procurement does not necessarily rend-
er competent evidence incompetent); Barnett, supra note 202, at 941 (explaining that the 
exclusionary rule may result in suppression of  “unquestionably reliable and probative” 
evidence).  
 211. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–24, 328 (1987) (overruling Linkletter and 
holding that all new rules for criminal procedure will apply retroactively to all cases pend-
ing on direct review or not yet final).  
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wins on the merits of his case, courts can pass on evaluating constitu-
tional issues under a harmless-error analysis.212  This makes it difficult 
for defendants to decide how to best litigate their cases: either by at-
tempting to race through the court system or in some instances wait 
in jail for trial to start.213  For law enforcement, the Davis decision in-
centivizes excessive constitutional violations with little fear of reper-
cussions.214
1.  No Matter How Well a Defendant Argues His Case, the 
Government Will Win 
  
In creating a good-faith exception based on reliance of subse-
quently overturned law, the Court has threatened to end the evolu-
tion of the Fourth Amendment law by reducing the adversarial 
process to such an extent that defendants may not even have standing 
to appeal their cases.  Additionally, courts can avoid addressing con-
stitutional questions as Fourth Amendment violations can now be 
treated as a harmless error.  
The Davis rule greatly diminishes the adversarial process.  Our 
judicial process rests on the idea “that the parties before the court 
have an actual . . . stake in the outcome,” and that this “preserves the 
vitality of the adversarial process.”215  Defendants like Davis will have 
no stake in the outcome of evidentiary challenges, since they know 
they will not benefit from the exclusion of evidence under the newly 
crafted good-faith exception.216  Arguments on evidentiary issues un-
der the Fourth Amendment before the Court will be less effective be-
cause the parties involved do not have a real interest in the result, and 
the evolution of the law will be stunted.217  Defendants might contin-
ue to make arguments, but only to make changes in the law for the 
benefit of future defendants.218
 
 212. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
  Courts following Davis will in essence 
 213. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 214. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 215. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (explaining that the adversarial 
system is crucial to achieving just results).  
 216. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 201, at 371 (suggesting that good-faith ex-
ceptions will stultify the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive for defendants to 
litigate issues).  
 217. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring that parties have a real stake 
in the outcome of the case so as to sharpen the arguments “upon which the court so large-
ly depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).  
 218. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Davis v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No. 09-
11328), 2010 WL 5168874, at *34. 
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be offering advisory opinions—statements of the law that do not affect 
the parties before the court—which are expressly forbidden.219
If defendants try to bring litigation where they have no hope for 
a remedy, it is possible they will not even have standing to challenge 
adverse evidentiary rulings.  Article III standing requires “that a favor-
able judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.”
 
220  Under the 
Court’s Davis rationale, if a defendant challenges an existing Supreme 
Court or circuit court Fourth Amendment precedent, the outcome 
will always be the same: the government always wins.221  Either the 
Court agrees with the government on the Fourth Amendment issue 
and therefore rules for the government on the merits, or the Court 
agrees with the defendant on the Fourth Amendment issue but the 
evidence gets admitted anyway under the expanded good-faith excep-
tion.222  The good-faith exception removes the Court’s ability “to re-
dress the defendant’s injury, eliminating Article III standing” for de-
fendants challenging established Fourth Amendment law.223  If the 
Court is not adjudicating cases on the merits, it is unclear why the 
Court should hear them at all.224
Fourth Amendment law will further stultify as courts can avoid 
reviewing constitutional issues under a harmless-error analysis.  When 
defendants raise issues on appeal, appellate courts can ignore any er-
ror “that does not affect substantial rights.”
 
225  The Court has said that 
an error does not affect substantial rights if it did not affect how the 
jury reached its verdict,226 and has even said that this can apply to vi-
olations of constitutional rights.227
 
 219. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the 
power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of 
litigants in the case before them.” (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
  Defendants attempting to exclude 
 220. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). 
 221. See Kerr, supra note 155, at 1082 (arguing that creating a good-faith exception for 
overturned law would skew all Fourth Amendment litigation in the government’s favor).  
 222. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 218, at 26. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgments of two of the three consolidated cases and dissenting in one). 
 225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).  
 226. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (explaining that the signi-
ficance of an error is determined by the “effect the error had or reasonably may be taken 
to have had upon the jury’s decision”).  
 227. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (“[T]here may be some constitu-
tional errors which . . . are so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed 
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”); see also Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court’s Harmless Consti-
tutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 317–18 (2002) (discussing the implications of 
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evidence as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation will not have 
their challenges reviewed since, under Davis, the constitutional viola-
tion is harmless: either the defendant loses his challenge on the me-
rits, therefore no constitutional violation and evidence is admitted; or 
the defendant wins his challenge but law enforcement acted in good 
faith, so evidence gets admitted anyway.  
The Court responded to these criticisms by suggesting that open 
questions of Fourth Amendment law in certain jurisdictions would 
still provide an avenue for constitutional litigation,228 but this argu-
ment cannot withstand scrutiny.  Even for open questions, it is diffi-
cult to see how law enforcement could not qualify for the new good-
faith test of reliance on overturned precedent.  For example, consider 
United States v. Jones,229 where the issue was whether the police use of a 
GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car without a warrant violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights.230
Indeed, under Davis, in the context of Jones, law enforcement 
could plausibly argue that, given that they had no direction on 
whether or not their actions were in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, their actions were reasonable and therefore exclusion would 
  Neither the Founding Fathers nor 
the Supreme Court has ever before considered the validity of such a 
practice under the Constitution, which makes it ostensibly an open 
issue of Fourth Amendment law.  All defendants similarly situated to 
Jones, whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated prior to 
the Jones decision but whose cases are still on direct review, are with-
out a remedy after Davis.   
 
the Chapman decision). Compounding this problem is that in a different context the Su-
preme Court has more recently held that appellate courts do not have to decide the merits 
of a constitutional challenge before deciding whether that constitutional violation was 
harmless.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (rejecting the two-prong anal-
ysis for qualified immunity questions under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).  Under 
Saucier, courts were required to answer first whether there was a violation of a constitution-
al right, and only after that could they determine whether that right was properly estab-
lished.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.  The Pearson Court maintained that this approach was pre-
ferred, but explained that it is no longer mandated. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.   
 228. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2011).  
 229. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). This case arose from a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case 
where two appellants, Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard, appealed their convictions 
after a joint trial for conspiracy to distribute. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064. 
 230. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  Specifically, the two questions raised at the appellate level 
were whether the placement of the GPS on the car constituted a search at all, and, if so, 
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that would prevent the po-
lice from tracking his movement in the car twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.  
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
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achieve no deterrence and should not apply.231  At worst, law en-
forcement’s actions in relation to open questions would be Fourth 
Amendment-neutral.232  The Court could reasonably conclude that 
deterrence is not advanced where police did not know their actions 
were unlawful, and thus refuse to suppress evidence.233
Additionally, the government may try to turn a seemingly open 
question into one already resolved by precedent.  In Jones, the gov-
ernment argued that it relied on binding appellate precedent when it 
used the GPS devices.
  
234  The argument was not implausible and, had 
the facts not included other Fourth Amendment violations resolving 
the case, could have triggered the problems noted above.235  Going 
forward, in cases like Jones, things will play out one of two ways: either 
the Court finds in favor of the government on the merits of the case 
and the petitioner loses; or it accepts petitioner’s argument, but still 
finds that the police were acting in reasonable reliance on binding 
appellate precedent.236
 
 231. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (noting that exclusion “should 
not be applied . . . to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity”).  
  In each scenario, the petitioner will not bene-
 232. Ultimately, the Jones Court spent no time addressing whether or not a remedy 
should apply for Jones.  There, however, Fourth Amendment violations included more 
than simply the open question of whether the use of a GPS device implicated the Fourth 
Amendment.  The officers in Jones had received a ten-day warrant for the use of the device 
in Washington, D.C., but installed the device on Jones’s car on the eleventh day and in 
Maryland.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  
 233. At least one court has noted with approval this argument post-Jones.  See United 
States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 
2012) (acknowledging the persuasiveness of the government’s argument that the police 
use of a GPS was reasonable, given that it was not held unconstitutional by the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and so exclusion would do nothing to deter police misconduct). 
 234. See Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
(No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881, at *12 (arguing that police relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–85 (1983), which allowed the 
use of electronic devices to enhance what a person “knowingly expose[s] to the public”).  
The government also argued that, under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to what someone “knowingly expose[s] to the public,” 
and so the tracking of the defendant’s movements in public cannot constitute a search.  Id. 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). 
 235. Three circuits had already either approved in a holding or noted with approval the 
use of GPS devices. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting Pineda-Moreno’s claim that attaching a mobile tracking device to his car 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 
(8th Cir. 2010) (ruling that Marquez did not have standing to challenge the use of GPS 
devices but also suggesting that the use of a GPS device is not a search as Marquez had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy over the location of his car); United States v. Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (approving of the use of a GPS device on the car of an indi-
vidual already under suspicion). 
 236. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.  
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fit from the exclusion of evidence and the government wins.237  So 
even “open” questions of Fourth Amendment law demean the adver-
sarial process by giving litigants no real stake in the outcome of their 
Fourth Amendment arguments, and allow courts to pass on difficult 
questions under a harmless error review.238
In response to this criticism, the Court said simply that overturn-
ing precedent is not a purpose of the exclusionary rule.
 
239
2.  Defendants Are Left with Unusual Tactics in the Hope of Getting 
a Remedy, While Police Are Encouraged to Violate the Constitution 
(the Government Wins)  
  Again, the 
Court used the exclusionary rule as a hammer to bludgeon any valid 
challenges to its increasing number of exceptions.  It is true that over-
turning case law is not a purpose of the exclusionary rule.  But arriv-
ing at the proper meaning of the Constitution is a purpose of the ad-
versarial process and of judicial review, and the Davis decision 
jeopardizes that process in the context of Fourth Amendment eviden-
tiary decisions.  The Davis decision threatens not only the validity of 
the judicial process, but negatively affects how lawyers and police act 
as well.  
Given that similar defendants will be treated differently and 
there may be no hope for a remedy through the exclusionary rule, de-
fendants are left with a choice of how best to manipulate the adjudi-
cation of their cases in order to get the best results.  For defense at-
torneys, the Davis decision creates a “race to the courthouse” 
scenario: each appellant will try to be the first one to reach appellate 
review in the hope of receiving a remedy for the violation of his con-
 
 237. This has already begun.  The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Iowa recently admitted evidence gained from the warrantless use of a GPS device based 
on the Davis good-faith exception that police had relied on binding appellate precedent.  
United States v. Amaya, No. CR 11-4065-MWB, 2012 WL 1188456 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 10, 
2012).  The Amaya court used the Davis rationale in a particularly troublesome way.  The 
court reasoned that police relied on binding appellate precedent where the Eighth Circuit 
had not definitively held that the use of a GPS device was legal.  Amaya, 2012 WL 118456, 
at *5 (citing Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610).  Marquez had rejected a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the use of GPS on standing grounds, but had noted in the alter-
native that the use would have been acceptable.  Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10.  The Amaya 
court reasoned that this was not dicta, but rather an alternative holding, and concluded 
that police reasonably relied on this alternative holding.  Amaya, 2012 WL 118456, at *5. 
This case reinforces Justice Breyer’s concern about the confusing nature of what makes for 
legal precedent, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing), and also shows how easy it can be for courts to interpret these types of Fourth 
Amendment challenges in the government’s favor. 
 238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.  
 239. United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2011).  
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stitutional rights.240  Conversely, some attorneys might try to delay the 
beginning of a client’s trial, knowing that a pending Supreme Court 
case could affect the outcome of the case, but that the client would 
not benefit from any newly announced rule if her case has already be-
gun and so sits in the Davis “direct review” purgatory.241
The government, by contrast, will be emboldened to continue to 
push the limits of constitutionally acceptable behavior.  Police can 
treat any ambiguous practice as having been already decided in their 
favor, comfortable with the knowledge that the Court will later grant a 
good-faith exception for their practices.  For example, by the time 
Arizona v. Gant was decided, police in many jurisdictions had been 
applying Belton as a per se right to search automobiles rather than a 
fact-dependent situation involving officer safety and the prevention of 
destruction of evidence.
  This will ac-
tually provide defendants with an incentive to remain in jail longer 
while awaiting trial.  
242
Even for procedures not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, 
police may feel completely comfortable continuing practices that the 
Court may later decide are violations of the Fourth Amendment.  
Consider once again United States v. Jones, the GPS-tracking case.
  If it turned out law enforcement violated 
the Fourth Amendment, as it was in those jurisdictions that applied 
Belton as a per se right to search, evidence would still be admitted un-
der the Davis good-faith exception.   
243  
The government argued that police relied on precedent in determin-
ing that attaching GPS devices to automobiles and tracking suspects 
over long periods was a constitutionally valid exercise.244
 
 240. It is actually unclear from the Davis decision, however, whether the first litigant to 
reach appellate review will even receive the benefit of a remedy.  Adhering strictly to the 
Court’s own logic, when police act in good-faith reliance on precedent, even the first suc-
cessful litigant may not have his evidence suppressed.  So it is possible that even Rodney 
Gant would not have benefitted from the Gant rule if his case had been litigated after the 
Davis decision.   
  Prior to Da-
vis, from the moment the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear 
Jones’s case, police would have had two choices: (1) continue the GPS 
tracking in the hope that the Supreme Court decides in their favor; 
(2) stop the procedure out of fear that the Supreme Court would de-
cide the practice is invalid and invalidate evidence derived from the 
 241. Cf. United States v. Davis, No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377, at *3 (M.D. 
Ala. Apr. 28, 2008) (noting the preservation of the search issue in the hope that the Court 
would change the Fourth Amendment landscape with its Gant decision).  
 242. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627–28 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 243. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 244. Brief for the United States, supra note 234, at 12. 
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illegal practice.  After Davis, law enforcement now has a third option: 
ramp up what could be a constitutionally-invalid procedure, knowing 
that the Court will still admit the evidence under the new good-faith 
exception.  Law enforcement officers know they can continue to ben-
efit from a potentially invalid procedure and will not suffer any of the 
consequences for their actions since the actions were done in good-
faith reliance on binding precedent.  For truly open questions, the 
government could argue that law enforcement could not be deterred 
from doing what it did not know was unlawful.  So why not benefit 
from the suspect practice as much as possible before it goes away?245
C.  Return to Principle and Fourth Amendment Rights 
  
Davis has created a system that incentivizes constitutional brinksman-
ship by law enforcement. 
As an alternative, the Court could have chosen to do nothing.  In 
other words, rather than create a new good-faith exception, the Court 
should have applied its retroactivity jurisprudence appropriately and 
given Davis the same remedy as Gant.  Even accepting the Court’s ju-
risprudence regarding the costs and benefits of exclusion, the costs in 
this case would be few, while the benefits would at least be maintain-
ing the principled justifications of the retroactivity doctrine.  Better 
still, the Court could have recognized the problems of the deterrence-
only rationale and re-injected principle into its exclusionary rule juri-
sprudence.  Doing so would place the exclusionary rule and the 
Fourth Amendment on stable ground.  
The Supreme Court could have simply followed its earlier hold-
ing that new rules of criminal procedure will apply retroactively to all 
cases on direct review or otherwise not final.246  Such a decision would 
have maintained the principled justifications that the Court supplied 
in Griffith when it abandoned the reasoning it now returns to in Da-
vis.247
 
 245. As an example, following the Jones decision, the FBI took down about 3,000 GPS 
trackers that were in use. Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of Devices After Supreme 
Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. BLOG (April 29, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits 
/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/. 
  Davis would have received a remedy for the violation of his 
rights.  Davis would have been treated the same way as Rodney Gant, a 
similarly situated defendant.  Granting defendants remedies will en-
 246. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 
 247. See id. at 322–27 (outlining the reasons for rejecting Linkletter).   
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sure the healthy evolution of Fourth Amendment law by maintaining 
a vital adversarial process.248
Even accepting the Court’s cost-benefit analysis, applying the re-
troactivity law as it stood before Davis would cost very little.  As the 
costs of exclusion are severely limited already,
  
249 excluding tainted 
evidence in cases like Davis would not greatly increase the social cost 
of exclusion.250 It is also exceedingly difficult to put an accurate num-
ber on just how many convictions are actually lost as a result of the 
suppression of evidence.251  Conversely, some of the benefits are 
equally hard to quantify because they deal with the theoretical benefit 
of rights.252  Even so, those rights are so basic to our system of justice 
that they must be protected.253  Ideally, the Court would not only ap-
ply the principled justifications of the retroactivity doctrine, but take 
this opportunity to reinvigorate the exclusionary rule with its prin-
cipled justifications as well.254
 
 248. See supra Part IV.B.1; see also Kerr, supra note 
  The Court in this case need not take 
even that modest of a step; it could have simply drawn a line on deter-
rence at the walls of the principled retroactivity doctrine and properly 
applied its own precedent. 
155, at 1082 (suggesting that proper 
application of the exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent on the court system from reach-
ing bad results, thereby enabling the evolution of good law).  
 249. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (creating a good-
faith exception for reliance on a negligently updated warrant list); United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (creating a good-faith exception for reliance on a magistrate’s 
warrant).   
 250. Moreover, from the facts of this case, it is possible that the evidence could have 
been admitted under the inventory exception to the exclusionary rule. See South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1976) (granting police the right to do an inventory 
search of an arrestee’s automobile after impounding the vehicle).  This issue was not chal-
lenged on appeal, and so was not briefed before the Supreme Court.   
 251. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (listing various empirical studies of the 
costs of the exclusionary rule that ultimately came back inconclusive). 
 252. See Schuck, supra note 180, at 26 (“Rights preoccupy a Don Quixote; remedies are 
the work of Sancho Panza.”).  
 253. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that Fourth Amendment rights “are not mere second-class rights but belong in the 
catalog of indispensible freedoms”).  Justice Jackson had returned as a prosecutor from 
the Nuremburg trials and recognized that one sure path to totalitarianism is to allow the 
government to trespass into your home and effects without justification.  Margaret Ray-
mond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
76 N.C. L. REV. 1193, 1227–29 & nn.118 & 120 (1998). 
 254. See Gray, supra note 194, at 3.  Professor Gray draws an analogy between justifica-
tions for the exclusionary rule and common-law justifications for criminal punishment and 
finds that deterrence alone cannot support exceptions to the exclusionary rule in the same 
way that a deterrence rationale for criminal punishment cannot justify culpability-based 
excuses from criminal punishment.  Id. at 4–5, 9–10.  He calls for a return to principle in 
the context of the exclusionary rule.  Id. at 3.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Davis decision incorrectly expanded the rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule onto the retroactivity doctrine.  As a result, the prin-
ciples of treating similar defendants the same and providing a remedy 
for rights have been swept away.255  This decision diminishes the ad-
versarial process by creating a system where the government always 
wins and will in effect end the evolution of Fourth Amendment law.256  
In practice, Davis makes it impossible for defendants to decide how 
best to litigate their cases while encouraging law enforcement to press 
the edges of what is constitutionally acceptable.257  The Court should 
have simply applied the retroactivity doctrine the way its own 
precedent demands.258
 
  This would have signaled that, in at least some 
areas, principle still wins out over empirical pragmatism.   
 
 255. See supra Part IV.A. 
 256. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 257. See supra Part IV.B.2.  
 258. See supra Part IV.C.  
